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During the decade of the 1970s, the United States sold more arms to
Iran than to any other country. In spite of Iran's vast oil wealth, the
billions of dollars spent by the Shah on arms aquisitions had a measurable
impact on both the country's economy and its ability to maintain a steady
rate of developmental growth. Iran has traditionally been regarded as a
non-resource constrained nation. However, in the latter half of the 1970s
Iran's trade surpluses dwindled, its foreign exchange reserves shrank, and
government expenditures outran revenues. All of which indicated that Iran
was becoming resource constrained. As such, the nation's tremendous de-
fense budget proved to be an economic burden. Spiralling inflation, fail-
ing development plans and rising unemployment were the result. The people's
rising expectations, brought on by the oil boom of 1973, were quickly re-
placed by a perception of relative deprivation. This prompted a linkage of
various disenchanted groups within Iranian society who together formed
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 1953, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh decided to usurp the powers of Mohhammad Reza
Pahlavi Shahanshah Aryamehr by dissolving the Majlis (Parlia-
ment) . The following day Mossadegh was dismissed and General
Fazullah Zahedi was appointed by the Shah as Prime Minister.
Mossadegh refused to leave and through the use of troops
loyal to him managed to remain in office. On August 16 the
Shah fled by plane to Baghdad and then on to Rome, while
General Zahedi escaped to the provinces. But on August 19
large crowds, spurred on by agents of the American Central
Intelligence Agency, took, to the streets of Tehran shouting
"Long live the Shah." General Zahedi 's troops attacked the
Mossadegh supporters and a small tank battle ensured. By
nightfall Zahedi was victorious. The Shah returned on August
22; Mossadegh was arrested, found guilty of attempted rebel-
lion and sentenced to three yeasr imprisonment; a new cabinet
under General Zahedi was approved; and on September 5, Presi-
dent Eisenhower authorized a $45 million emergency grant to
Iran. In October the bazaar shops closed in protest of
Mossadegh's imprisonment. Several shopkeepers were arrested.
When a second attempt at closing ensued, the Shan ordered the
vaulted bazaar roofs demolished. The merchants quickly re-
opened and shifted their support to General Zahedi. Thus
10

began 2 5 years of unquestioned rule by the Shah with the full
support of the United States government.
This stately friendship provided a number of benefits
for both the United States and Iran. For the United States
Iran was a bastion of stability and support in a region of
instability and hostility; an unswerving supplier of oil for
the U.S. and its other Middle Eastern ally, Israel; a state
bordering the Soviet Union which freely permitted installation
of U.S. "listening posts"; and an eager and wealthy purchaser
of American exports. For Iran the United States proved to be
a rich repository of technical assistance; a purchaser of oil
who complained little about price increases; a willing educa-
tor for students of all subjects; and an equally willing sup-
plier of all manner of high technology equipment, industrial
and military alike.
2Furthermore the Shah was, in Allisonian terms, a "rational
actor," at least from the standpoint of eight American Presi-
dents, including the present administration. This made him
something of a novelty among third world leaders and greatly
enhanced the affability of American-Iranian relations. For
the Shah's part— in spite of the current flood of demeaning
rhetoric—he was both a reformer and a progressive. During
the 25 years from 1953 through 1978, the Shah sought to
industrialize the country, modernize the society, develop
the economy, and build a military structure that was, region-
ally, second only to the Soviet Union. He promoted literacy
11

and women's rights, instituted land reform, and directed an
economy with a Gross National Product that grew at an average
rate of 15.4 per cent a year from from 1968 to 1977. Un-
fortunately, this may well have been the principal cause of
the Shah's downfall. Iran's rapid leap into the twentieth
century was more than a twenty-five hundred year old govern-
ment could effectively cope with.
A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
During recent months a number of volumes and articles
have appeared discussing the various aspects of the Shah
of Iran's government and his fall from power. Most have
been non-analytical, personal accounts such as Amin Saik.al's
The Rise and Fall of the Shah , William Farbis ' Fall of the
Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran , and Fereydoun Hoveda '
s
The Fall of the Shah . Others have been written by authors
with a wide assortment of "axes to grind" such as Sepehr
Zabih's Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval , Fred Halliday's Iran :
Dictatorship and Development , and Raymond Habiby and Foribarz
Ghavidel's "Khumaynih's Islamic Republic" which appeared in
Summer 1979 issue of Middle East Review . And still others
have made attempts at rational analysis, but without the bene-
fit of currently available data, such as James Bill's "Iran
and the Crisis of '78" in the Winter 1978/79 issue of Foreign
Affairs, Robert Graham's Iran: The Illusion of Power
,
Theodore Moran's "Iranian Defense Expenditures and the Social
12

Crisis" in the Winter 1978/69 issue of International Security
,
and Stephanie Neuman's "Security, Military Expenditures and
Socioeconomic Development: Reflections on Iran" appearing
in the Fall 1978 issue of Orbis
.
On the subject of arms transfers most works that have
included data on Iran have been merely descriptive in nature,
emphasizing factors such as the arms industry, the origins
of arms trade, the different kinds of weapons and their trans-
fers, sales of second-hand weapons, expenditures involved,
methods of transfer, and so on. Much the same can be said
for volumes on the Iranian economy. For instance, works such
as Robert Looney ' s A Development Strategy for Iran Through
the 1980s and Iran at the End of the Century , Jahangir
Amuzegar's Iran: An Economic Profile , and Samueles Lieber-
man's "Prospects for Development and Population Growth in
Iran" in the June 1979 issue of Population and Development
Review discuss such topics as allocation of oil revenues,
development problems, economic growth, inflation, distribu-
tion patterns, manpower policies, public sector and fiscal
policy, and provide a variety of enlightened projections for
the future (none of which are likely to be even remotely
correct)
.
This is not to say that these works are without founda-
tion or worth. On the contrary, they provide a wealth of
information and insight. Nevertheless, to this writer's
knowledge, there is no work that explores in depth the complex
13

connection between Iran's arms purchase, the economy, and the
political atmosphere that led to the fall of the Shah's
government.
The analytical framework which guides this study draws
on two theoretical approaches. The first approach, used by
Peter C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, deals with the
impact of defense expenditures on economic growth in develop-
4ing countries. This worked, based on the initial findings
of Emile Benoit, proposes that defense expenditures in coun-
tries which are not resource constrained play a positive and
important role in increasing economic growth; and conversely,
that countries which suffer a lack of foreign exchange and
government revenues are growth impeded by defense expenditures.
Both the Benoit and Frederiksen-Looney studies are based on
cross-national data covering the period 1950-65. In the
latter work Iran is included as one of twenty-four countries
adjudged to be non-resource constrained. Thus, one can assume
that during the period covered, Iran's defense expenditures
and arms purchases benefitted rather than hampered economic
growth. However, it is the contention of this thesis that
beginning in 1976, with declining trade surpluses, fiscal
deficits, and falling foreign exchange balances, Iran became
a resource constrained nation and, as such, its growth was
hampered by defense spending.
The second approach, proposed by Ted ^Gurr in 1968, offers
an explantion for the linkages between perceived deprivation
14

and the magnitude of civil strife. Gurr proposed that
. .
.a psychological variable, relative deprivation,
is the basic precondition for civil strife of any
kind, and that the more widespread and intense depri-
vation is among members of a population, the greater
is the magnitude of strife in one or another form.
Deprivation can be either persistent or short-term and can
be attributed to several different indicators. Between depri-
vation and civil strife are four intervening variables; the
regimes 's coercive potential, national institutionalization,
facilitation (both past levels of strife and social and
structural facilitation), and the regime's perceived legiti-
macy. These variables, depending on their magnitude, can
impair or enhance the probability that deprivation will re-
sult in strife. Thus, it is the second contention of this
thesis that economic and developmental difficulties in Iran
during the years 19 76-78 resulted in the perception of rela-
tive deprivation by a sufficient proportion of the population
to plant the seeds of civil strife.
Methodologically, therefore, this study attempts to utilize
a combination of objective and subjective approaches as a
means of achieving a comprehensive analysis. This eclectic
approach is justified for two reasons. First, arms transfers
and economic data can be quantified. Arms transfers have
been measured using a variety of techniques including budgetary
data, dollar valuation, inventory technique, technological
indexes (factor analysis and multiplicative measures), and
most recently by Multiattribute Utility (MAU) measurement,
15

a procedure developed by Ronald Sherwin and Edward Laurance
gto analyze military capability. The method of analyzing
a national economy is somewhat more standardized, though, as
is also the case for arms transfers, the data available is
often of questionable accuracy. Second, a deeper understand-
ing of the interaction of arms purchases, economics, and
political events, can hardly be attained without a serious
consideration of the non-quantifiable attitudes, goals, and
perceptions of the individual actors. That is, the people's
perception of their level of relative deprivation. The clan-
destine National Voice of Iran accused the Shah of having
"squandered more than $30 billion worth of oil revenues on
9
arms purchases." To a certain extent, whether or not this
statement is correct is immaterial. What is important is
that many Iranian militants believe it to be true, hence it
is of significance to the political analysis.
B. DEFINITION OF BASIC TERMS
Some of the basic terms used in this study require brief
definition for clarity. The term "arms transfers" is used
in the sense prescribed by the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.
Arms transfers represent the international transfer
under grant, credit, or cash sales terms of military
equipment usually referred to as 'conventional, 1 in-
cluding weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, sup-
port equipment, and other commodities considered
primarily military in nature. Among the items included
are tactical guided missiles, rockets, military aircraft,
naval vessels, armored and nonarmored military vehicles/
16

military communications and electronic equipment, ar-
tillery, infantry weapons, small arms ammunition and
other ordinance, parachutes, and uniforms. Also in- , Q
eluded are transfers of equipment for defense industries.
The term "military expenditure" is used in the manner defined






show the amount of
money actually spent (or likely to be spent. . . ) for
military purposes. Expenditure is defined to include
resources devoted to research and development, to
include military aid in the budget of the donor coun-
try and to exclude it from the budget of the recipient
country, and to exclude war pensions. The figures are
presented on a calendar year basis . ^
For the purposes of this thesis the three areas of the
Persian Gulf, the Northern Tier, and the Middle East, are
treated as a single geopolitical region. Since 1973 it has
become increasingly difficult to maintain the traditional
distinction between the major issues of the three regions.
The political, social, and economic issues of the Middle
East have spillover effects in the Persian Gulf and Northern
Tier and vice versa. However, the three areas are discussed
separately in the text whenever such effects are absent.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized in four chapters exclusive of the
Introduction and Conclusion. Following the introduction the
second chapter examines American arms transfers to Iran during
the 1969-77 period. This to include as complete a listing as
possible (given available, unclassified sources) of all arms
17

ordered by Iran, arms actually delivered, and the cost of
those arms in both current and constant dollars.
The third chapter examines Iran's economic Development
Plans, giving particular emphasis to the Fourth and Fifth
Plans. Many of Iran's political problems have been blamed
on the failuare of these plans. The reason most often given
for their lack of success is inadequate development funds
due to high military expenditures. In fact, the Development
Plans may well have been overly ambitious and ill conceived
to begin with.
The fourth chapter attempts to analyze the Iranian economy
during the period 196 8-78 to include sectoral growth rates,
sectoral impact on per capita gross national product (GNP)
,
absorptive capacity, impact of military expenditures on
nonmilitary sectoral growth rates, and so on. The chapter's
main objective is to provide a determination of the potential
effects of rechanneling military expenditure resources into
other economic sectors, in other words the "opportunity cost"
of Iranian defense expenditures.
The fifth chapter correlates the information of the pre-
vious chapters and provides an estimate of the actual impact
of Iran's arms purchases on the political instability that
led to the Shah's downfall.
The concluding section is not meant to review and summarize
the material discussed in the main body of the work. Instead,
it will provide general comments on the subject at hand and
raise a few questions on the subject that bear further study.
18

II. A SURVEY OF AMERICAN ARMS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPLIED TO
IRAN DURING THE PERIOD 1969-1977
During the ten year period 1969-78, the United States
supplied Iran with some of the best conventional arms and
weapons systems available in the world. Under the policy of
what has since become known as the Nixon Doctrine, the sale
of these sophisticated weapons was considered in keeping with
the best interests of the United States government. The Arab-
Israeli war in October 1973 and the subsequent oil embargo
and price increase had a signficant impact on all facets of
American foreign policy. One outgrowth was a heated debate
among scholars and politicians over the effect these events
might have on American relations with Iran and the Middle
East in general.
The debate focused on the changing nature of the Iranian
government. Heretofore Iran had been "strong, proud, confident
and yet militaristic, repressive, and self-centered; a price
hawk on oil, but a dependable supplier to the United States
and Israel; a paranoid and interventionist around the Gulf,
12but a supporter of conservative pro-Western regimes." For
twenty years the Shah had been a constant, a given, a perma-
nent fixture of the Middle East and an island of stability
in a sea of pandemonium. However by 1977, the strains of a
too rapidly developing society began taking their toll on
the Shah and his government. For the first time some analysts
19

came to the realization that the Shah may not be around for-
ever. Iran's domestic problems became a popular topic of
conversation and debate both in the White House and in
Congress.
One of the most significant issues of the debate con-
cerned how to fashion American military relations with Iran
so as not to exacerbate the Shah's internal problems. The
debate was evenly divided between the one side which urged
restraint in arms sales to Iran and the other that felt
Iran should be militarily strong at any cost. The first side
eventually gained legitimacy through President Carter's injunc-
tion (PD-13) limiting the introduction of new levels of weapons
sophistication into a region. The other side, using the
Nixon Doctrine as their platform, lost a good deal of credi-
bility when President Nixon resigned from office. In either
case, the debate, as we now know, was focused on too narrow
an issue. Questions of human rights, repressive regimes,
Iraqi military buildups, and Soviet activity in the Horn of
Africa, South Yemen, and Afghanistan, though important, were
not necessarily germain to the problem at hand. More to the
point was opportunity cost of Iran's vast military expendi-
tures and the impact the economic drain was having on the
14
economy and the society.
This chapter examines American arms transfers to Iran
during the last ten years of the Shah's rule of Iran. No
attempt is made to analyze these arms acquisitions in terms
20

of sophistication or practicality as the question is not
what weapons were purchased but how much was paid.
A. AMERICAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN
Following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf
in 1968, the governments of both Great Britain and the United
States urged the Shah to expand his military. In June of
that year the Shah visited the United States and requested
a reported 600 million dollars in U.S. arms over the next
six years. President Nixon formally granted him 100 million
for 1969, with the remainder of the request subject to an-
nual review. This represented a major acceleration of pur-
chases as a 196 4 agreement had provided for arms sales to
Iran of 50 million dollars annually. Furthermore it appears
that the Shah was also given "assurances," or an "understanding"
was reached, that he would receive a 500 million dollar credit
for the acquisition of more Phantom aircraft over the next
15five years
.
In 1970, as Iran was midway through its Fourth Development
Plan, the Shah initiated a five year modernization plan for
his military forces. This plan included a reorganization of
the three services and purchase of sophisticated military
hardware from the United States, Great Britain, France, and
Italy. The budget for this plan is not in the public domain,
but it was without a doubt considerable as approximately one




One further note before reviewing Iran's arms purchases.
Estimates of U.S. arms sales to Iran run from a low of 61 per
cent to a high of 73 per cent of Iran's total arms purchases.
The second largest supplier was the Soviet Union with 11.5
to 20 percent of total acquisitions. Virtually all Soviet
arms were delivered prior to 1969 and, as such, not germain
to the period of time covered by this study. Arms supplied
by other nations are valued in terms that are statistically
insignificant in relation to the total of Iranian defense
expenditures. As the United States was by far and away Iran's
major arms supplier, and as data on U.S. arms transfers is
presumed to be more accurate than that obtained from other
nations, it is these sales that will receive the greatest
attention (See Table I.)
B. AIRCRAFT
During the period 1969-78, the United States supplied
Iran's ground, sea, and air forces with the vast majority
of their aircraft, be they fixed wing or helicopters. As
of 1978 virtually the entire Iranian combat aircraft inven-
tory consisted of American manufactured hardware. As early
as 1966 the United States agreed to sell Iran advanced high
performance aircraft in the form of the F-4D Phantom. Delivery
of the first squadron, consisting of 36 aircraft, was made
in 1968. Over the next ten years, the Shah's desire for














Source: DMS Market Intelligence Report, 1979 .
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and bounds. By 1976 the Shah had received 30 of an ordered
80 F-14A Tomcats, ordered 160 F-16s, and expressed an in-
terest in purchasing the land-based version of the F-18, an
aircraft that was still on the drawing board. According to
one source, Iran contributed $1.9 billion for the Research
1 6
and Development (R&D) program for the F-14. Furthermore
the Shah had also volunteered to share in the Research and
Development cost of the F-18.
Table II provides a summary of the major aircraft pro-
curement programs initiated by the Shah, and the current
status of each. The procurements with the status of "un-
certain" will probably be cancelled as current political
relations between the United States and Iran are all but
nonexistent. In either case it is interesting to note that
the cancelled aircraft ordered, scheduled for delivery in
the 1978-80 time frame, exceed by approximately 50 per cent
the value of all aircraft delivered during the preceding
ten years.
C. TANKS, APCs, ARTILLERY, AND MISSILES
Prior to 1971, the United States was Iran's major supplier
of tanks. At present about one half of the Iranian inventory
of over 1,000 tanks consists of American made M-24 Chaffee,
M-47 Patton, M-48 and M-60A1 tanks. All were delivered be-
tween 1954-62 except 72 M-60Als delivered in 1974. In 1971,




Major Iranian Aircraft Procurement Programs
Value
Equipment Quantity ($ millions) Status
AH-1J helicopters 202 367 Delivered
214A helicopters 287 431 Delivered
214A helicopters 6 4 Uncertain
214C helicopters 39 22 Delivered
CH-47C helicopters 50 425 Uncertain
RH-53D helicopters 6 86 Delivered
SH-3D helicopters 18 363 Delivered
F-4E aircraft 177 857 Delivered
F-5F aircraft 28 102 Delivered
F-14 aircraft 80 930 Delivered
F-16 aircraft 160 3,400 Cancelled
RF-4E aircraft 12 143 Delivered







Source: DMS Market Intelligence Report, 1979 .
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an order with the British government for 760 Chieftains.
These make up the main battle tank contingency of the Iran-
ian armored forces. By 1975 orders were placed for an ad-
ditional 1,350 Improved Chieftains and 300 Scorpions. These
orders have recently been cancelled.
On the other hand the United States has continued to be
Iran's major supplier of APCs and essentially the only sup-
plier of artillery. As of 1976 about half of the Iranian
army's APCs were American made M-8 Greyhounds and M-113Als,
all of which were delivered prior to 1968. Iran's heavy
artillery consists entirely of American made M-107, M-109,
and M-110 field pieces delivered between 1968-78.
The Iranian military is equipped with a variety of mis-
siles procured from the United States, Great Britain, and
France. Prior to 1970 U.S. missiles in the Iranian inven-
tory consisted primarily of HAWK, Sidewinder AIM-9, and Spar-
row AIM-7F3 . However, as part of the military modernization,
major purchases of Phoenix AIM-54A (primary armament for the
F-14A) , Maverick AGM-64, Dragon, TOW, Improved HAWK, and
Standard RGM-6 6 missiles were made. The Iranian inventory
is known to contain an equally impressive array of British
and French products. Furthermore Iran had signed contracts
to purchase TOW missiles and launchers and British BAC Rapier
missiles. The Rapier missiles are part of a tracked system,
including the U.S. made M-548 vehicle and Marconi Blindfire




Table III annotates Iranian purchases and undelivered
orders between 1969-78 of tanks, APCs, artillery, and mis-
siles. An unspecified number of Phoenix AIM-54A missiles
were provided with Iran's F-14As and are not reflected in the
table.
D. NAVAL VESSELS
Prior to Great Britain's 1968 decision to withdraw from
the Persian Gulf, the Iranian Navy was virtually nonexistent.
In 1967 the main fleet consisted of a British ex-Battle Class
frigate and two American ex-Pf-103 class Corvettes. Again
however, with the military modernization program, the Iranian
Navy was greatly expanded. As can be seen in Table IV, the
Shah's preoccupation with highly sophisticated marine hardware
was much the same as that for aircraft.
E. IRANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
During the years 19 70-77, the Iranian government devoted
approximately 31 per cent of its total annual budget to mili-
tary expenditures. Furthermore, according to Theodore H. Moran
".
.
.there is evidence that civilian accounts included sizable
military allocations (e.g., approximately 70 per cent of the
'public housing' outlays in recent years have gone for mili-
tary construction) that could amount to an additional 3 to 5
19
per cent of the central government's budget." All this adds
up to a fairly substantial outlay, something over $9 billion
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Major Iranian Naval Vessel Procurement Programs
Value
Equipment Quantity ($ Millions) Status
DD-963 destroyers 4 1,467 Cancelled
TANG submarines 3 54 Cancelled
MK-III patrol craft 19 10 Delivered
PGM-71 patrol craft 3 NA Delivered
CAPE class coastal craft 4 NA Delivered
Total Delivered 10
Total Cancelled 1,521
NA - data not available
Source: DMS Market Intelligence Report, 1979.
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portion of this expenditure was devoted to the actual purchase
of American and other foreign manufactured arms. During the
same 1970-77 time frame arms importation expenditures averaged
23.8 per cent of total defense expenditures, or slightly less
than 5 percent of the total government expenditures. This
amounts to slightly less than $1.5 billion in 1976, and only
about $5.5 billion for the period 1968-76. Though still a
substantial sum, it is a far cry from the National Voice of
Iran 's $30 billion figure cited earlier.
In terms of constant 1969 dollars, Iran's total government
expenditures, defense expenditures, and arms importation ex-
penditures grew at similar rates through the period 1970-77,
28.29%, 26.6%, and 21.2% respectively. (See Table V.) Gen-
eral government expenditures received an impressive boost
following the 1973 oil price hikes. Prior to 1973 the growth
rate of government expenditures had averaged 11.8 per cent,
and after 1973 the figure fell to 8.3 per cent. These lower
figures are more characteristic of Iran's government expendi-
ture growth than is the earler quoted 28.2 per cent. The key
to this vast disparity in growth rate averages is the in-
credible 137.3 per cent increase that occurred in 1973.
Defense expenditures and arms importation outlays show
a generally greater growth stability through 1970-77 than do
the general expenditures. Arms import expenditure growth,
as would be expected, peaked in 1971 following the American
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of the military modernization program. Defense expenditure
growth started to peak the following year and reached a high
point of 63.9 per cent in 1973, corresponding to the increase
in total government expenditures. Finally , in spite of the
rapid development of Iran's military and the vast sums ex-
pended on weapons, it should be noted that deliveries made
to Iran amounted to only 28.3 percent of the dollar figure
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III. A REVIEW OF IRAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS, 1968-1978
In 1946 the Shah of Iran established the High Planning
Commission and tasked it with the preparation of an economic
development plan for the nation. The first seven-year plan
was adopted by the Majlis (Iran's Parliament) in 1949 and
covered the period 1949-55. The plan called for a total ex-
penditure of Rls.21 billion (approximately $646 million). As
may be recalled from the Introduction, Mohammad Mossadegh
seized the Shah's powers in 1953 and nationalized all foreign
oil holdings in Iran. The ensuing international boycott de-
stroyed Iran's economy and with it the First Development Plan.
In 1955, with the Shah back in control, the second seven-
year development plan was approved. The plan projected an
outlay of just of Rls.70 billion ($933 million) between
1955-62. This figure was increased to Rls.84 billion in 1957
and the following year the plan underwent a complete revision.
The Second Development Plan's success is dubious at best, as
a large share of the expenditures were directed toward re-
storing the chaos left behind by Mossadegh.
The first attempt at a sophisticated, comprehensive develop-
ment plan came in 196 3 with the Third Development Plan. This,
the first of the five year plans, called for an expenditure
of nearly Rls.400 billion ($5.2 billion) —a considerable in-
crease over the First and Second plans—and covered the years
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196 3-6 7. It was during this Third Development Plan that Iran
took its first giant steps towards modernization. Notably,
the foundations were laid for most of Iran's steel, machine
tool, and petrochemical industries; the Shah's ambitious Land
Reform Program was planned and executed; and a vast amount of
the nation's agriculture related resources, including forests,
pastures, and water supplies, were nationalized. One of the
goals of the Third Plan was to increase the nation's Gross
National Product (GNP) by at least 6 per cent annually. Ac-
cording to Iranian statistics the achieved GNP growth amounted
21
to 8.8 per cent per year, hence, the plan was dubbed a success.
It is however the period encompassing the Fourth and Fifth
Development Plans with which this paper is concerned. This
chapter will endeavor to review the Iranian Government's de-
velopment planning for the period 1968-78 and the budgetary
data that these plans indicate. (See Table VII.)
A. THE FOURTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN (196 8-73)
The Fourth Plan had as its principal goal a 9 per cent an-
nual increase in GNP. Population growth during this period
was projected at 2 . 6 per cent and it was hoped that per capita
income would reach RLS. 26,900 ($359) by 1973—a 32 per cent
increase over the 19 6 8 level. To achieve this growth a fixed
investment of Rls.810 billion ($10.8 billion) would be needed.
Of this Rls.810 billion, it was hoped that Rls.745 billion




Proposed and Actual Public Investment Expenditure
Under the Fourth Development Plan (1968-78) (Rls. bn)
Proposed (%)* Actual (%)**
Total 480 (100.0) 506.8 (100.0)
Agriculture 87.4 (18.2) 41.2 (8.1)
Petroleum 93.6 (19.5) 79.7 (15.7)
Industry 6. Mining 107.2 (22.3) 113.1 (22.3)
Services 192.0 (40.0) 272.8 (53.9)




foreign investors. On the domestic side, 55 per cent was to
come from the public sector and 45 per cent from the private
sector. Oil revenues were to provide the main source of
funds for the development. Of the projected Rls.487 billion
oil revenue, 80 per cent was to be devoted to development.
Finally, annual industrial and agricultural sector growth
rates were targeted at 13 and 4.5 per cent respectively.
By all accounts and indexes the Fourth Development Plan
was more successful than the Shan's planners could have
thought possible. (See Tables VIII-XIII.) GNP achieved an
average growth rate of 13.8 per cent and by 1973 per capita
GNP in real 1969 terms reached Rls.38,681—an anverage increase
of 10.4 per cent per year. Investment targets were exceeded
in the industry, mining, and public services sectors. However,
the growth rate for industry and mining fell short of the mark
by approximately 2.8 per cent. Investment in the petroleum
sector amounted to 85 per cent of the target figure. Yet,
due to the 1973 oil price hike, the sector achieved an average
growth of nearly 50 per cent per year. Only agriculture suf-
fered markedly during the Fourth Plan. Public and private
investment in the agriculture sector amounted to only 47.2 per
cent of the Rls.87.4 billion target figure. As a result, agri-
culture's input to the Gross Domestic Product CGDP) fell by
approximately one quarter of one per cent per year, requiring
an increase in food imports from Rls.1.3 billion in 19 68 to
Rls. 8.5 billion in 1973.
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Average Sectoral Output as a Percentage of GDP Through the










Source: Data compiled from the following sources: Bank Markazi Iran,
Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1975 ; Bank Markazi Iran,
National Income of Iran, 1338-50 (1959-72); Jahangir Amuzegar,
Iran: An Economic Profile ; Robert E. Looney, Iran at the
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Average Sectoral Growth Rates Through The Fourth and
Fifth Development Plans
1968-73 1974-77 1968-77
GDP 10.23 16.85 14.86
Agriculture -0.24 7.63 3.26
Oil and Gas 49.63 18.62 35.85
Industry and Mines 10.24 18.15 13.76
Services 6.04 21.60 12.96
Source: Data compiled from the following sources: Bank Markazi Iran,
Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1975 ; Bank Markazi Iran,
National Income of Iran, 1338-50 (1959-72); Jahangir Amuzegar.
Iran: An Economic Profile ; Robert E. Looney, Iran at the End
of the Century; and OPEC till 1985.
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During the course of the Fourth Development Plan a number
of major industrial projects initiated during the Third Plan
were completed. These included the Isafahan Steel Complex,
the Rolling Mills Plant in Ahvaz, metal plants at Arak and
Tabriz, three petrochemical projects on the Persian Gulf coast,
and the Andimeshk tractor assembly plant in Tabriz. These
projects were the outgrowths of a policy to introduce industry
outside of the Tehran region by designating Rasht, Shiraz, and
Mashhad as new industrial centers. Additionally the Economic
Ministry allocated a number of special projects to the pro-
22
vincial areas where industrial stimulation was sorely needed.
B. THE FIFTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN (19 73-78)
Iran's Fifth Development Plan for the five-year period
1973-78 was originally approved by the Majlis in February of
1973. Total investments for the Plan were envisioned to be
Rls.2500 billion ($36.4 billion) with the public and private
sector providing 6 3 and 37 per cent respectively. However,
subsequent sharp increases in oil prices and government reve-
nues during 1973 and 1974 radically altered the Plan's finan-
cial projections and called for a wholesale revision of the
target figures. Contrary to the previous plans, the revised
Fifth Plan was formulated under conditions where financial
resources did not constitute a constraint. The revised Plan
projected a total fixed capital investment of Rls.4,699 bil-
lion (nearly $70 billion) , almost twice the figure of the
44

original Fifth Plan, and over six times larger than the
Fourth Plan. Interestingly, according to Bank Markazi Iran,
the "absorptive capacity of the economy (was) the most im-
portant determining factor in the allocation of additional
23financial resources." CSee Table XIV.)
In revising the Fifth Plan, four basic considerations
were given priority attention. First, given rapidly rising
oil prices and government revenues, the Shah's planners sought
to attain the maximum balanced and steady rate of economic
growth with minimum prices increases. Second, inherent draw-
backs such as insufficient skilled manpower, raw material
shortages, and inadequate infrastructure were taken into
account. Third, a concerted effort was made toward coordi-
nating the five-year plan with annual budgets. Finally, a
20-year general economic development plan was developed to
link the Fifth, Sixth, and future plans.
According to Jahangir Amuzegar the revised Plan envisioned
six qualitative targets. In descending order of priority they
are:
(1) to raise living standards of all social strata in
economy, and to enhance social justice by providing
equal economic, political and cultural opportunities
for all individuals and groups;
(2) to maintain a high and sustained rate of growth con-
sistent with relative price stability and a more
equitable distribution of national income and welfare;
(3) to improve the quality and size of the country's
active labor force in order to increase productivity;
(4) to preserve, rehabilitate and improve the environ-




Proposed and Actual Total Fixed Investment Expenditure Under the







Original (%) Revised (%)
2461.0 (100.0) 4699.0 (100.0)
152.6 (6.2) 310.1 (6.6)
460.2 (18.7) 789.4 (16.8)
551.3 (22.4) 845.8 (18.0)








Source: *Plan and Budget Organization, Planning Division, Planometrics
Bureau, Iran's Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, Revised, A
Summary (Tehran, Iran: May 1975); **Bank Markazi Iran,
Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various issues.
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(5) to upgrade the level of science, technology and
creativity; and
(6) to preserve the country's cultural heritage.
In light of recent events, it would seem that these quali-
tative objects would have been more agreeable to the general
populus had their priority been reversed.
The Plan and Budget Organization predicted that, during
the period of the Fifth Plan, Iranian Government receipts
would amount to approximately Rls.8,297 billion, of which
roughly 80 per cent would come from the sales of oil and
natural gas. Of total government disbursements, 41 per cent
was to be devoted to current accounts, 34 per cent for fixed
investments provided for in the revised Development Plan,
9 per cent for overseas investments, and the remaining 16
per cent was earmarked for foreign loan repayments and mis-
cellaneous expenditures.
In March 1973, at the conclusion of the Fourth Development
Plan, Iran's GNP at current prices was Rls. 1231 billion
(about $17.9 billion) , representing a per capita GNP of
Rls. 40,311 ($585). Under the revised Fifth Plan, the GNP
(at constant 1972 prices) was expected to reach Rls. 3,686
billion ($55.0 billion). Per capita GNP, based on a projected
16 per cent population increase, was expected to reach
Rls. 102,664 or more than $1520 in constant 1972 prices.
The first four years of the revised Fifth Plan's opera-
tions showed some degree of success, although achievements
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were generally behind scheduled targets. Total fixed invest-
ment expenditure had reached only 31.3 per cent of the total
planned outlay. Among the various sectors, agricultural
investment was the highest with 91 per cent of the target ex-
penditure, industry and mining had reached 71 per cent, the
petroleum sector in 19 77 had reached only 18.7 per cent of
its target, and the figure for social services was a dismal
15.5 per cent. As a result GNP had averaged a 17.3 growth
rate, 8.6 per cent shy of the 25.9 per cent target. /Per capita
GNP suffered in a similar manner.
Quoting Jahangir Amuzegar once again,
The principal responsibility for the gap between ex-
ante and ex-post growth targets could be traced to a re-
duction of oil exports in 19 75/76, infrastructural
bottlenecks (particularly ports and transport facilities)
,
acute shortages of skilled manpower and management talent,
and many unfavorable effects of worldwide recession cum
inflation on the availability and prices of imports and
freight. The remaining two years (author's note : Amuzegar'
s
data only went through 19 76) of the Plan may still make up
for part of these losses. 25
C. THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THE BUDGET, AND MILITARY
EXPENDITURES
An in depth analysis of the relationship between develop-
ment expenditures, budgetary problems and expenditures, and
military expenditures is the object of the next chapter on
Iran's economy. However, at this point it may be useful
to summarize briefly the connections evidenced in this and




During the period of the Fourth Development Plan, Iran's
defense expenditure grew at the rate of 26.6% per year. Total
government expenditures grew at the even higher rate of 28.2
per cent. The investment target of Rls.48Q billion was not
only met but exceeded by roughly 5.5 per cent. Iran's Gross
Domestic Product averaged a growth of 13.3 per cent annually
and per capita GNP grew each year at 11.3 per cent. Given
these figures, should there be argument against the high level
of defense expenditures? Probably not. Iran's consumer price
index rose 23.8 per cent between 1969 and 1973. To the average
consumer this meant an inflation rate of about 6 per cent.
This may seem low in comparison to the 14 per cent or higher
inflation currently being felt in the United States, but for
a deveoping nation with a per capita income of less than $6Q0
six per cent inflation is a significant figure. More often
than not, government expenditures are the principal cause of
inflation. Defense expenditures during the Fourth Develop-
ment Plan amounted to over Rls 410 billion or about 81 per
cent of the amount invested in development. Had a significant
portion of the defense expenditures been channeled into de-
velopment, Iran's already burdened absorptive capacity would
have merely translated the funds into higher consumer prices.
As shall be seen in Chapter III, the opportunity cost for
development investments was very low outside of the oil sector.
Economic relationships during the term of the Fifth De-
velopment Plan are not nearly as clear cut. Government
49

expenditures grew at an annual rate of 35 per cent, however
this figure is deceiving. Government expenditures from 1973
to 1974 grew 137.3 per cent, yet from 1975 to 1976 the growth
was a minute 0.7 per cent. In real terms, government revenues
grew by less than 6 per cent in 1975 due to a 14.9 per cent
reduction in the volume of crude oil exports and a mere 0.2
per cent price increase. When wide fluctuations in government
revenues and expenditures occur, such as those experienced in
Iran between 1973-76, the economic sectors most likely to suf-
fer are those that are dependent on long term investment plan-
ning. Development plans, once devised and approved, are
difficult to alter. The plan is, more often than not, not
a guideline but a detailed schedule. It tells the nation's
administrators not only how much to spend and what to spend
it on, but furthermore when to spend it. Iran's development
goals for the first year of the Fifth Plan, 1973, were easily
met, but the substantial excess funds (probably burning a
hole in the Shah's pocket) were quickly channeled into non-
productive, noncapital forming projects such as military
modernization. To make matters worse, target expenditures
for the Fifth Plan were nearly doubled. This revision, in all
probability, was based not on sound economic planning, but
on the euphoria of sudden wealth. By 1976-77, the current
expense created by earlier investment in various noncapital
forming enterprises including not only defense but a wide
50

variety of social, educational, and welfare programs, caught
up with the revenue increases of 1973 which had gone rela-
tively unchanged since that year. Funds for development
investment were still available in quantities higher than
ever before, but they were insufficient to meet the expec-
tations of the Fifth Plan.
The data presented in these first two chapters is in-
sufficient to evaluate the foregoing to any state above that
of supposition. However, in the following chapter an attempt
is made to substantiate these hypotheses based on Iran's
economic and budgetary statistics.
51

V. AN ANLAYSIS OF IRANIAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE
PERIOD 1968-78
Prime Minister Mossadegh's May 1951 decision to nation-
alize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company C.AIOC) was not a carefully
planned move. Given the disastrous results of the nationali-
zation it would appear that the Majlis passed the bill with
the belief that it simply meant channelling the profits from
AIOC stockholders' pockets into the Iranian treasury. In fact
it meant operating the oilfields and the sophisticated Abadan
refinery as well as marketing both crude and refined petroleum
products. Since most key functions of the industry and market-
ing had previously been run by expatriate personnel, Mossadegh
was unable to maintain production. As a result, the Iranian
oil industry virtually closed down from 1951 until 1954. In
purely economic terms, as oil was the backbone of the Iranian
economy, the net result was a near total collapse of Iran's
hitherto booming economy.
However, since the mid-19 50 's, the Iranian economy has
grown rapidly. In August 195 4 Iran, once again under the
Shah's leadership, negotiated a new oil agreement with a
27
Consortium (known as the Seven Sisters) of major oil companies.
The agreement provided for a fifty/fifty division of profits,
gave the Iranian government sovereignty over certain non-
essential operations, and compensated the AIOC very sub-
stantially for losses incurred by nationalization. However,
52

unknown to Iran, the Seven Sisters worked out a secret agree-
ment governing future oil production levels from Iranian
fields. Production was to be balanced against the major
oil companies global oil interests so that any production
increase was the result of internal agreement. As such,
Iranian revenues were entirely dependent upon the production
level set by the Consortium. The details of this agreement
28
were kept secret until 1967.
Throughout the 1960s world demand for crude oil increased
rapidly so that by 1970 the industry became a seller's mar-
ket. Furthermore, increased militancy within OPEC slowly
improved Iran's bargaining position in relation to the Con-
sortium. Nowhere was this enhanced position more evident
than in the Tehran Agreements of February 14, 19 71, between
Persian Gulf oil producers and the major oil companies. The
agreements were highly complex, but the major thrust was that
for the first time producers were to receive compensation for
losses of purchasing power through inflation and dollar fluctu-
ations. Between 19 70 and 1972 Iranian oil production increased
32 per cent to 5.02 million barrels per day while revenues
more than doubled from $1.12 billion to $2.39 billion. On
March 20, 1973, the Consortium handed _ over all remaining
operations and ownership to the National Iranian Oil Company.
Iran had finally achieved what Mossadegh had failed to accom-




This chapter analyzes Iran's economic performance during
the ten years prior to the Shah's fall from power in January
1979. This will include a review of aggregate and sectoral
growth, employment, price stability, income distribution,
investment opportunity cost, and absorptive capacity. Fur-
thermore an attempt is made to estimate the impact of arms
transfers on these economic arenas and a subjective estimate
of the possible effects of rechannelling arms expenditures
into other investments during the period.
A. ECONOMIC GROWTH: AGGREGATE AND SECTORAL
According to Robert Looney:
The easiest task in examining the growth of any country
is to describe what has happened in terms of its overall
macroeconomic trends and growth rates in the key sectors.
A more difficult task, particularly in the case of Iran,
is to explain why certain events happened, and how spe-
cific goals set for the economy by the authorities were
or were not achieved. It may be trite—but still true
—
to state that the process of development in Iran is com-
plex and poorly understood. 29
A truer statement will not be found in all the available litera-
ture on the Iranian economy. An even more nebulous area of
analysis is the impact of Iran's military expenditures on
that country's economic growth. There is little agreement
as to which features of Iran's economy were "good" and which
were "bad." And there is even less agreement as to whether
or not Iran's arms expenditures adversely affected economic
growth. However, few would agrue that Iran's economic per-
formance since the mid-1960s has not been generally superb.
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The Gross Domestic Product's (GDP) growth behavior during
the 1968-1978 period may be divided into two distinct periods.
Between 1968 and 1972, coinciding with the Fourth Plan, the
GDP grew at 9.86 per cent—marginally exceeding the Plan's
nine per cent target. After the 1973 oil price increases,
the annual real growth rate reached a spectacular 25.24 per
cent in 1973 and 56.73 per cent in 1974. However, stabilized
prices and reduced petroleum production provided for a growth
rate of only 3.81 per cent during the period 1975 to 1977.
Thus the growth rate during the Fifth Plan (through 1977) was
18.68 per cent. During the 1Q year period, Iran's GNP in-
creased from a mere $8.3 billion in 1968 to more than $30
billion in 1977. Per capita income went up from $3Q6 to
$880, a 186 per cent increase in real purchasing terms.
Referring once again to Tables VIII through XIII, the cru-
cial role of the oil and gas sector to the Iranian economy
can clearly be seen. This importance is not only applicable
to aggregate supply but, as can be seen in the consumption
figures in Tables XV and XVI, to aggregate demand as well.
Oil revenues, as a readily available source of foreign ex-
change and the main component of the government's income,
played a critical role in advancing both consumption and pub-
lic investment expenditures. This, in turn, provided a boost
to private consumption through monetary injection into the
expansion of credit. On the supply side, the oil and natural
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growth performance. During the period 196 8-73, while the
economy enjoyed a real annual growth rate of 13.3 per cent,
the major contribution was provided by the social services
sector including transportation, communications, domestic
trade, home rentals, and public and private services. However,
during the 1973-78 period, coincident with the Fifth Develop-
ment Plan, while the economy clipped along at a real growth
rate averaging better than 16.8 per cent, the major financial
impetus was provided by the oil sector, followed by social
services. The value added by the oil and gas sector (i.e.
that sector's contribution to GDP in real terms) rose from
13.9 per cent in 1968 to a high of 50.6 per cent in 1974 and
falling to 35.8 per cent in 1977—an average annual growth of
35.8 per cent!
In 19 75, under the impact of worldwide recession, and a
23 per cent decline in the value added of the oil sector,
the overall growth rate of GDP fell to 2.9 per cent. The
non-oil GDP, however, rose 29.4 per cent during the same year.
The loss of oil revenues had a delayed effect on the non-oil
GDP as the non-oil growth aver§ged only 5.8 per cent during
1976-77. This serves to demonstrate the tight linkage be-
tween oil production and economic growth.
Table XII shows the growth behavior of the different eco-
nomic sectors during the period 1969-77 while Table XIII shows
the average growth rates during the periods of the Fourth and
Fifth Development Plans and over the entire nine year period.
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As can be seen the industrial and mining sector experienced
a relatively high growth rate of 13.8 per cent per annum,
likewise services grew at an average rate of just under 13.0
per cent. The agricultural sector, however, grew at an annual
rate of a mere 3.3 per cent. The poor performance of agri-
culture is not surprising as, like many rulers of developing
countries with a large agricultural sector and an impoverished
rural populace, the Shah mixed politics and agricultural de-
velopment usually to the detriment of the latter. The Shah
treated agricultural development as an issue of land owner-
ship and the allegiance of the rurual masses rather than the
economic one of production. Thus as the economy began to
stimulate demand and the standard of living rose, Iran sud-
denly encountered a shorage of domestically produced food-
stuffs. However, at the moment when structural reforms should
have been introduced to eradicate the problem, there seemed
so many other priorities (e.g., defense modernization) that
the agricultural sector was routinely ignored.
It would seem ironic that the introduction of land reform
coincided with the beginning of agriculture's decline in over-
all importance in the economy. Several authors, currently
critical of the Shah's development scheme, claim that the
Shah deliberately sacrificed agriculture in order to con-
centrate on the development of industry and infrastructure.
In so far as agriculture received some 16.6 per cent of the
investment expenditure under the Fourth and Fifth
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Development Plans this criticism would appear to be a distor-
tion. It would seem more likely that, with the government's
energy devoted to industrialization, the Shah lacked the will
or desire to follow through at the ground level the difficult
and time consuming task of making his land reform program
work. In purely monetary terms the agricultural sector re-
32
ceived a sizable proportion of the investment pie.
The excellent growth rate of Iran's industrial and mining
sector rolled off sharply in 1976-77 because of two fundamental
problems faced by many developing nations . First was the prob-
lem of improving the international competitiveness of Iranian
industrial products. The key to this difficulty is per capita
productivity. For whatever reason neither monetary incentives
nor improved training provided the per capita productivity
33increases necessary to give Iran the required competitiveness.
Secondly, in the waning years of his reign the Shah slowly fell
victim to the lure of self-sufficiency. This desire for inde-
pendence, overshadowed industrial cost factors, efficiency,
and, in the end, consumer interests.
As mentioned earlier the growth rate of the services sec-
tor was approximately equal to that of industry during the
1968-77 period. Within the services sector banking and in-
surance displayed the highest annual rate of growth; followed
closely by housing rentals and public services; while domestic
trade, transportation and communication, and private services
lagged substantially behind. The growth in banking services
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reflected the proliferation of branch banking, increased
credit availability, and the rapid monetization of the
economy. The expansion of other services was due primarily
to the increased role of both the public and private sectors
in meeting the increased socio-economic demands of Iran's
more affluent populous.
As a result of the disproportionate sectoral growth rates
the composition of the economy and the relative sectoral
contributions to GDP changed considerably from 1968-77. The
value added by agriculture in 1968 made up 23.4 per cent of
GDP (Table X) but by 1977 this had dropped to only 9.4 per
cent in real terms. Agriculture, once the largest single
sectoral contributor to the Iranian economy, had thus become
dwarfed by other sectors. The spectacular growth enjoyed
by the oil and gas sector was mainly a result of higher oil
prices. And, though non-oil sectoral output increased in abso-
lute terms, it was principally due to oil's increased share
of GDP that the non-oil sectoral shares fell.
B . EMPLOYMENT
Detailed data on employment in Iran are not readily avail-
34
able. Nevertheless, the extent to which job opportunities
have been created—and filled—is important in evaluating the
success of the country's economic growth and its ability to
utilize oil revenues in bettering the people's standard of
living. Iran's high rate of population growth (averaging
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nearly 2.7 per cent from 1968 to 1978) has meant that in-
creasingly larger numbers of new workers joined the labor
force each year, and it was necessary to employ these labor-
ers in order to minimize social and civil strife. It is
estimated that Iran's labor force grew at an average annual
rate of 3 . 5 per cent during the period 1968 to 1978 (Table
XVII)
.
The additional eight tenths of one per cent over the
population growth rate can be attributed principally to in-
creased employment opportunities for women as the Shah liber-
alized (by decree) the nation's attitudes towards women in
public life. it should also be noted that due to the sub-
stantial wage inequality between agricultural and non-
agricultural employment a significant number of new
non-agricultural job opportunities were needed to provide
employment for farmers who migrated to the cities in search
£ u- u 36of higher pay.
Iran's efforts to reduce unemployment during the 1960s
and early 1970s were fairly successful. As oil revenues in-
creased and the economy grew, numerous jobs opened in the
industrial and service sectors. By 1974, following the oil
price increases of the previous year, the employment boom
reached a point where there were more ^obs than laborers
—
particularly in the area of skilled labor. Even a tripling
of higher education enrollment in the decade prior to 1976
failed to provide the requisite number of skilled workers.
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However, in 1974 the employment trend reversed itself. With
a decline in oil revenues, the government's failure to meet
investment goals of the Fifth Development Plan, a rapid influx
of unskilled and uneducated rural dwellers into the cities,
a continually growing shortage of managerial and skilled labor-
ers, a higher percentage of the female population joining the
labor force, and the still rapidly increasing population, un-
employment once again became a problem. By 1978 it is con-
servatively estimated that 7 to 8 per cent of the labor force
was unemployed. Other, perhaps more accurate estimates, run
3 8
as high as 15 to 20 per cent.
Insofar as sectoral labor statistics are concerned, the
percentage figures shown in Table XVII are probably more
representative of the period's trends than are the actual
employment figures. As can be seen in the Table, agricul-
tural employment fell from 46.1 per cent of the labor force
in 1968 to only 29 per cent by 1978. Many of these generally
uneducated ex-farmers found employment in industry, mining,
construction, etc., while a few entered the social sector
or the armed forces . Of particular interest is the number
of personnel employed by the petroleum industry. Though the
oil and gas sector work force doubled during the decade fol-
lowing 196 8, it should be noted that in 1978 the sector em-
ployed less than one per cent of Iran's total labor force.
Thus investment in the petroleum sector provided essentially
no direct source of new jobs.
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Referring back to Table XVI, per capita GNP can be seen
to have risen in real terms from Rls. 25,385 (about $335) in
1968 to Rls. 62,171 (about $821) in 1977. An important ques-
tion here would be how closely this data reflects the degree
to which the real income of the average Iranian laborer has
increased. As with employment data, wage data is equally
difficult to obtain making it difficult at best to offer a
statistically supported analysis of the issue.
In 1971 the minimum daily wage was approximately Rls. 100
(about $1.30), and in many cases actual wages were only equal
to or below this level. Up until this time the minimum wage,
set by the government, was rarely enforced, particularly in
the agricultural sector, and the "backyard" industries such
as carpet weaving. Furthermore, prior to 1972, wages barely
kept pace with inflation. Data compiled by the International
Labor Office from Ministry of Labor figures indicate that in
1971 the average annual wage for a skilled or semi-skilled
laborer in the manufacturing field in Tehran (where wages were
highest) amounted to approximately Rls. 66,000 (about $871).
Annual salaries for industry executives and high level civil
servants often ran in excess of Rls. 1,000,000 ($13,2Q0). 3
However, beginning in 1972 the Iranian workers' wages
increased rapidly. As can be seen in Table XVIII the annual
index of wages far surpassed other price indices in the decade
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of the 1970s. From a base level of 100.0 in 1970, the wage
index rose to 618.2 by 1977 while the consumer price index
rose to only 222.4. By 1975 secretaries in Tehran could make
$900 per month and truck drivers over $700. This income
level approached those of middle to upper level management
executives of private industry only four years earlier. Thus
it would seem that laborers, at least those in the industrial
and service sectors, experienced a significant improvement
in their financial position during the 1970s.
D. PRICE STABILITY
In spite of large scale development expenditures by the
Iranian government, reasonable price stability was maintained
until the oil price boom of 1973. Referring to Table XIX,
it can be seen that from 1968 through 1972 wholesale, con-
sumer, and household goods prices averaged only a modest 4.2
per cent annual rate of inflation. Furthermore, given the
fact that most of the increases occurred in 19 71-72 (the
last two years of the Fourth Development Plan) , the Fourth
Plan's objective of price stability was a reasonable success.
However, with the boom in oil prices, higher rates of
investment expenditures brought on by the Fifth Development
Plan, and emerging limits on productive capacity, the pres-
sure on internal inflation rapidly increased. Furthermore,
rapidly rising wages and higher import prices helped to push
Iran's domestic inflation into double digit proportions. By
68

1974 wholesale and consumer prices reached inflation rates
of 17.0 and 14.3 per cent respectively. This was due pri-
marily to the demand pull and cost push pressures of higher
wages and salaries. In mid-19 75 the government implemented an
extensive and strict price control program which served to
bring the wholesale price inflation rate down to the more
tolerable level of 7.9 per cent. Unfortunately, the price
controls had little effect on consumer prices which continued
to increase at a rate of 12.8 per cent through 1975 and 11.3
per cent the following year.
Throughout the period 1978 through 1978, the GDP deflator—
the most comprehensive measure of price level changes—in-
creased at an average rate of 12.4 per cent per annum. Thus
it would seem that even with the harshest of price control
regulations the Iranian government could not have high growth
rates and low inflationary rates at the same time.
E. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC EQUITY
Very little data—and certainly no reliable data—are
available on the internal distribution of income and wealth
in Iran. Nevertheless this remains one of the most contro-
versial issues surrounding Iran's rapid rate of growth.
Though all judgemental observations regarding economic dis-
tributional equity must be regarded as indicative and con-
jectural, several distinct trends in the Iranian income
distribution have been clearly identified.
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A "poor" Iranian household was defined in 1971, as one
with annual expenditures of less than Rls. 60,600 (about $800)
.
At that time approximately 54 per cent of Iran's households
fell into the "poor" category. About 42 per cent of the
Iranian households were labeled "middle class" and had annual
expenditures between Rls. 6Q,6QQ and Rls. 238,600 (about $3150)
Only 4 per cent of Iran's households were considered "rich"
with annual expenditures in excess of Rls. 238,000. Approxi-
mately 60 per cent of the upper and middle class families
resided in urban areas while only 25 per cent of the lower or
"poor" class maintained their domicile in an urban area. Thus,
in Iran poverty would seem to be principally the domain of
the rural regions. Furthermore as would be expected, there
appears to be a notable correlation between income level and
education. Among rural dwellers approximately one-third of
the upper and middle class family members are illiterate
while nearly two-thirds of the lower income class have had
little or no education. In urban areas these figures fall
to about 15 per cent for the upper and middle class and ap-
41proximately 40 per cent for the lower class.
According to data compiled from the Annual Survey of House-
hold Expenditures produced by the Bank Markazi Iran, 64.63
per cent of the annual total household expenditures made in
urban areas in 1969 were made by the richest 30 per cent of
the population. (See Table XX.) However by 1973 this figure




Decile Distribution of Household Expenditures in Urban Areas
(1969-73) (percentages)
Decile
(lowest to highest) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1 1.59 1.48 1.34 1.37 1.37
2 2.86 2.62 2.39 2.51 2.40
3 3.96 4.07 3.60 3.36 3.42
4 4.58 4.54 4.32 4.64 4.77
5 5.94 5.60 5.66 5.16 5.08
6 7.96 7.68 6.94 6.98 6.85
7 8.48 8.23 8.57 9.51 9.36
8 11.72 11.48 11.70 11.14 11.19
9 16.05 16.18 16.00 18.38 11.57
10 36.86 38.12 39.48 36.95 37.99
Source: Compiled from Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Survey of Household
Expenditures, (Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1969, 1970, 1971,




"rich" were getting poorer while the "poor" were getting
richer. On the contrary, in 1969 the poorest 30 per cent
of the urban populace expended only 8.41 per cent of the
total household expenditures, and by 1973 this figure too
had declined to 7.19 per cent. Thus, while income recipients
in all deciles enjoyed absolute gains in money income ad-
justed for price increases, the highest rate of gain was in
the burgeoning middle class. Furthermore, it should be
noted that while the upper 30 per cent experienced a 6 per
cent decline in their share of total money expenditures be-
tween 1969 and 1973, the top decile enjoyed a 3 per cent in-
crease in their share.
During the same 19 69-73 period urban incomes grew at a
faster rate than did rural incomes. And, as would be expected,
workers with advanced educations gained more rapidly than
those with lower levels of schooling. Furthermore urban
dwellers possessed a higher share of total household expendi-
tures than did the rural populace, and expenditures in the
urban areas were more unequally distributed than in the rural
regions (see Table XXI).. In 1971 the lower 30 per cent of the
urban populace expended 10.29 per cent of the household monies
while the same 30 per cent of the rural dwellers share was
11.65 per cent. During the same year the upper 30 per cent
of those households in urban areas accounted for 60.07 per cent
of the expenditures while the same group in the rural areas




Decile Distribution of Household Expenditures (1971)
(percentage)
Decile











Source: Compiled from Statistical Center of Iran, Survey of Household
Expenditures
,
(Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1973).
Cited in Looney, A Development Strategy for Iran
,
p. 48.













In A Development Strategy for Iran Through the 1980s
,
Robert Looney cites six patterns of Iranian distribution that
are worthy of reiteration herein:
1. Between 1959 and 19 71 the inequality in income
distribution in Iran increased. Over the period 19 71
to 19 73, however, there was a tendency for inequality
of household expenditures (and thus income distribution)
to stabilize or even decline slightly.
2. The distribution of income in rural areas is
less equal than in urban areas.
3. There is some evidence that in urban areas the
share of middle-income classes has been rising.
4. Households in the bottom income deciles, particu-
larly in the urban areas, usually have no literate members
and have a high rate of unemployment. Furthermore, their
households heads are either self-employed (in rural areas)
or wage and salary earners (in urban areas)
.
5. There are considerable variations in regional ex-
penditure inequality. High income regions, such as Fars
and Central Province, show a greater degree of inequality
than do poorer regions.
6. The ratio of urban to rural expenditure, govern-
ment development expenditures, and the overall educational
attainment of households have a significant influence upon
income distribution in Iran. 42
Given the foregoing, it is apparent that Iran's pattern of in-
come distribution during the 19 70s is open to various forms of
criticism and could certainly play a significant role in creating
political instability. These criticisms and the impact on Iran's
politics will be discussed in the next chapter.
F. ARMS TRANSFERS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Following the oil price increases of 19 73, Iranian plan-
ners at first perceived physical rather than financial
74

constraints as the principal barrier to achieving rapid
economic development. The revised Fifth Development Plan of
March 1975 envisioned the expenditure of some $112 billion
on industrial development, social services, and defense with
a net revenue surplus of approximately $11 billion upon com-
pletion of all projects. However, by 1976, with an 11 per
cent drop in the demand for Iranian oil, the government faced
both balance-of-payments and fiscal deficits (see Tables XXII
and XXIII). Thus the numerous and varied plans for how Iran's
monetary reserves were to be invested abroad to produce the
income needed to sustain the nation's economic growth after
43
oil exports began to decline were summarily scrapped.
Thus, in addition to the planners' fears, it would seem
that Iran in the late 1970s possessed financial as well as
physical constraints on growth. The financial constraints
were an outgrowth of several planning errors or miscalcula-
tions including an overestimation of Iran's future oil reserves,
an underestimation of development costs and the effects of in-
flation, and certainly an underestimation of the rate of
growth of the current account budget. The revised Fifth Plan
predicted a ratio of approximately 3:,1 of capital expenditures
over current costs. However by mid-1974 this ratio was actually
44
about 1:1 with current accounts still increasing.
The 1977 oil price increase (10 per cent above the 1976
level) did little to alleviate Iran's fiscal shortfall. Even
had Iran been able to make a 15 per cent increase in the price
75
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of oil and export at full capacity, only 53 per cent of the
Fifth Plan's economic projects could have been completed, 59
per cent of the social projects, and 89 per cent of the "pub-
45lie affairs" projects. In any case, 12 per cent of the
expenditures on social projects were for non-civilian
purposes, while domestic security (principally SAVAK) ac-
46
counted for 27 per cent of the "public affairs" expenditures.
However, in light of the Shah's preoccupation with building
47
a strong military, it would seem likely that with the budget-
ary shortfalls of 1977/78 defense and internal security ex-
penditures, both capital and current, would receive priority
funding over the public sector projects. Unfortunately, this
is mere supposition as published data on non-civilian capital
expenditures under the Fifth Plan is essentially nil.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of civilian
versus non-civilian investment expenditures, let us review
the impact of military expenditures on Iran's economic per-
formance based on that data thus far presented.
1 . Economic Growth
The effects of non-civilian expenditures on growth are
difficult at best to ascertain. Traditionally, from the govern-
ment's standpoint, the military is not a profit-making enter-
prise. As such there is no direct input to growth from the
defense sector. There are however numerous indirect inputs
in the areas of infrastructure, industry, construction, and
finance. The defense and internal security establishment
78

require bases of operation, roads, housing, office space,
industrial manufacturing capability and the like. In Iran's
case the lion's share of the construction was undertaken by
the public sector. To a certain extent the percentage of
government financed construction dedicated to non-civilian
projects is immaterial. The construction industry benefitted
whether it was building Bank Markazi financed apartments in
Tehran or barracks in Bandar Abbas. However, from the stand-
point of economic growth Iran certainly had room for improve-
ment in the allocation of resources, particularly in the latter
half of the 1970s when its finances became constrained. Per-
haps Iran's largest bottleneck was its transportation system.
Yet rail and road construction (be to discussed in greater
detail later) moved very slowly. The multiplier effect of
transportation development would dictate that during a period
of reduced financial resources Iran should have reduced de-
fense expenditures and rechanneled the funds into the civilian
sector.
According to Julien Bharier, Iran's defense -expenditures
never dropped below 23 per cent of the general budget through-
48
out the years of the Shah's reign. This lends support to
the data presented in Table V. From that table it can how-
ever be seen that the cost of actual arms imports averaged
somewhat below 8 per cent of all government expenditures during
the period 1970-77. This means that at least 15 per cent -.
usually somewhat more) of the government's total annual
expenditures were dedicated to defense purposes, current or
79

capital, other than the purchase of arms. The current
expenditures, principally salaries, were inputs into
the general economy while the capital expenditures effected
the pattern of growth in the social services sector. How
much of the social services sector growth rate of approxi-
mately 13 per cent between 1968 and 1977 can be attributed to
defense and internal security captital expenditures is unsure-
but certainly it was a factor.
2 . Employment
As far back as the 19 20s the armed forces have been
an important source of employment in Iran. During the years
1968-78 the military employed an average of 3.2 per cent of
Iran's labor force. In 1978 the military employed in excess
of 500,000 personnel representing 4.7 per cent of the labor
force and some 17.2 per cent of those employed in non-
agricultural sectors. Those serving the military in some
indirect capacity must have numbered in the tens if not hun-
dreds of thousands more. The oil boom of 19 74 had as much
an impact on the relationship between military and civilian
employment as it did on other economic areas. Traditionally
Iran's military was a relative privileged branch of employ-
49
ment. However, in the 19 70s competition with the private
sector for skilled technical and managerial personnel put
the armed forces at a disadvantage due to lower pay scales
.
The shortage of technically skilled military personnel may
have been a problem for the armed forces (as it was for the
80

private sector as well) but strictly speaking the Shah's
large defense expenditures did provide an ever growing em-




According to Fred Halliday the rank and file Iranian
solider earned between 500-600 rials per month in 1974, while
officer wages ran from 30,000 rials per month for a captain
to a high of 100,000 rials per month for a senior general or
52
admiral. In light of the 100 rials per day minimum wage
instituted in 1971 these figures, particularly for enlisted
rates, would seem rather low. Furthermore, Plan and Budget
Organization data indicates a personnel expenditure of
Rls. 54.8 billion in 1974 or nearly 169,000 rials per soldier,
sailor, and airman. Though perhaps not quite equal to private
sector wages, it is fair to assume that the military man's
pay in Iran was more comparable to that of his civilian counter-




Like economic growth, the impact of military expendi-
tures on price stability is difficult to ascertain. Neverthe-
less one can safely say that the massive government expenditures
for Iran's military machine certainly fueled internal infla-
tion by adding to the every increasing money supply, which by
54
1975 was increasing at 60 per cent per annum. It should be
noted that Iran's oil revenues alone did not cause inflation.
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At the risk of being tautological , the income had to be spent
before anything happened as a result of it.
5. Income Distribution and Economic Equity
It is unlikely that Iran's military provided much re-
lief for the inequities in the nation's pattern of income
distribution. To the contrary, the defense establishment
fostered the pattern's continuation. Certainly some percent-
age of those displaced from the agrarian sector found employ-
ment in the armed forces though the exact numbers are unknown.
Those people that fit into this category were generally poorly
educated, from low income families and the position they ob-
tained in the military were befitting of their traditional
position in the economic pyramid. They would have remained
in the lower economic strata. Furthermore, the armed forces
exacerbate the problem of geoeconomic distribution by further
concentrating income and government dispersals in urban areas.
The majority of Iran's large military facilities are located
in or near large cities such as the air bases at Tehran,
Hamadan, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz, or naval bases at
Khorramshahr, Kharg Island, and Bandar Abbas.
To briefly summarize, about the most one can say in
regard to the impact of arms transfers on Iran's economy is
that they had an adverse impact on growth in the latter 1970s.
However, it is unclear as to whether or not reduced defense
expenditures and increased development expenditures would




(1) The widely publicized attention to the aggregate costs
of military expenditure has tended to exaggerate the
scope of Iran's military buildup. Most critics have
ignored the degree to which inflation, both internal
and international, affected the costs. The difference
between articles and services has not been routinely
considered. Furthermore, the aggregate cost approach
neglects the spillover benefits of military construction
to the economic infrastructure, i.e. roads, ports, air-
fields, communications, etc.
(2) Iran's rapid military buildup took place coincident
with an equally rapid general economic development plan.
Not unexpectedly, the economy became overheated with
rampant inflation. Unquestionably military expenditures,
particularly internal expenditures, served to fuel the
inflationary spiral. However it is unclear as to whether
or not a reduced defense budget would have had any
appreciable cooling effect on the economy.
(3) Iran's booming industrial, service, and defense sectors
provided numerous employment opportunities. Unfortunately,
Iran's labor force was not equipped with the technical
and managerial skills required in many positions. Fur-
thermore, the shortage of skilled personnel became a
point of contention between not only the competing ci-
vilian and military sectors, but among the competing
branches of the armed forces as well.
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(4) Infrastructural inadequacies created nightmares for
both military and civilian planners. Iran's booming oil
income allowed planners in both sectors to rush headlong
into infrastructural development. Unfortunately poor
coordination in the government accounted for consider-
able overlap in some areas while others were left un-
touched. The resultant wastage of economic, labor, and
material resources fostered greater animosity among com-
peting sectors and further fueled inflation.
G. MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
This topic has, in recent years, been the most controver-
sial concern of Iranian military and economic analysts. The
question is simple—would Iran (and the Shah) have been bet-
ter off (read avoid the current strife) had more of the na-
tion's economic resources been devoted to development and/or
financial investments abroad and less to military expansion?
The answer, if one exists, is somewhat more complex. The
issues at hand are twofold. First is the question of opportu-
nity cost and second, the problem of Iran's economic absorp-
tive capacity.
1 . The Opportunity Cost of Investment
Let us now return to the Benoit and Frederiksen-Looney
studies mentioned in the introduction. In 1973 Emile Benoit
published the first major study of the effects of defense
expenditures on growth in developing countries. His
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findings generally supported the thesis that opportunity
costs of defense expenditures were no higher than non-military
capital investment expenditures. The forty-four nation study
using data for the 1950-65 period concluded that:
The big surprise of this study was the finding that
the evidence does not indicate that defense has had any
net adverse effect on growth in developing countries. . . .
The crucial evidence in this matter was the finding
that the average 1950-6 5 defense burdens (defense as a
per cent of national product) of 44 developing countries
were positively, not inversely, correlated with their
growth rates over comparable time periods: i.e., the more
they spent on defense, in relation to the size of their
economies, the faster they grew—and vice versa. This
basic correlation was strong enough so that there was less
than one chance in a thousand that it could have occurred
by accident. 58
The more recent work of Frederiksen and Looney lends substan-
59tial support to some of Benoit ' s findings . The study divided
thirty-seven countries into four distinct groups characterized
by their relative abundance of financial resources. The first
group consisted of twenty-four countries (including Iran) , and
was characterized by a relative abundance of financial resources.
Group II consists of nine resource constrained nations. Group
III (Burma, Syria, and Iraq), fell somewhere between Groups I
and II, and Group IV, consisting solely of Vietnam, was con-
sidered a special case due to the number of extreme values.
Frederiksen and Looney concluded that
The most striking result, and one that confirms our
original hypothesis, was that the coefficient of the
defense variable was positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 99 per cent level for Group I but negative
and statistically significant at the same level of confi-
dence for Group II. . . .

Thus, the main finding of this paper is that defense
expenditures in countries which are not resource constrained
do not compete excessively for scarce resources. As a re-
sult of their other positive aspects (education, linkages
with industry, etc.), defense expenditures can play an im-
portant and positive role in increasing growth. Countries
suffering from a lack of foreign exchange and government
revenues on the other hand experience the reverse. For
these countries, defense expenditures apparently siphon
funds away from more productive domestic investments re-
sulting in a detrimental effect on growth. 60
Neither Benoits's work nor that of Frederiksen and
Looney is absolutely conclusive. Nevertheless, these studies
and others do provide strong evidence to support the hypothe-
sis that Iran's defense expenditures did not have a negative
effect on growth and, as such, had an opportunity cost at
least equal to that of other, non-military, capital invest-
ments. This of course assumes that Iran was not constrained
by financial resources. Given Iran's substantial income from
oil and natural gas exports, this assumption is commonly ac-
cepted as true. However, beginning in 1976, Iran, according
to the Frederiksen-Looney. model, became resource constrained.
From 1976 onward Iran's entire economy began to slow down.
Both revenues and expenditures declined in real terms, but
revenues declined more rapidly resulting in fisical deficits
that climbed each year. Imports and exports declined, but
exports declined faster resulting in shrinking trade surpluses.
Foreign exchange earnings decreased, the percentage of exports
to GDP declined, import elasticity declined, and the percentage
of government revenues spent on civilian consumption increased.
All these factors point to constrained resources. As such,
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defense expenditures in the latter 1970s did have a negative
impact on Iran's economic growth. This in turn would give
rise to— if not the perception of relative deprivation, at
least—the fear of future deprivation among Iran's economic
elite.
2. Iran's Absorptive Capacity
Under the Shah's rule, Iran's capacity to absorb goods
and services—defense oriented or otherwise—was rather exten-
sive. The nation possessed a moderately large population,
relatively abundant resources other than petroleum, and at
least twenty years worth of investment in infrastructure and
social overhead capital. Nevertheless, there were problem
areas and absorptive capacity was by no means unlimited. Fur-
thermore, the constraints on absorption affected both the mili-
tary and civilian sectors in the same manner. Indeed, the
competition between these sectors and between the various
branches of the armed forces proved in itself detrimental to
Iran's absorptive ability.
Iran's principal constraints on growth and absorption were
the nature of its labor force and the development of its infra-
structure. Iran's population, employment levels, and labor
force makeup have been discussed early in this paper and only
some elaboration is required here. Iran's population at
the end of the Fifth Development Plan (1978) was about 36 mil-
lion. The Plan projected the addition of some 2.1 million new
jobs by 1979. However the total domestic labor force was
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expected to increase by only 1.4 million, leaving a gap of
fi 2
more than 700,000 vacant jobs. This conflicts with the
unemployment data provided in Table XVII which shows Iran as
having nearly one million unemployed workers in 1978. In so
far as the Fifth Plan investments were well behind schedule
in 1977-78, it follows that new job additions were also be-
hind schedule—though the supply of laborers was not. In
any case, Iran's labor force problem was not quantitative but
qualitative.
As early as mid 19 75 shortages of skilled and semi-skilled
manpower in most industries and occupations (including the
armed forces) were beginning to pose a serious constraint on
growth. Both government officials and private company execu-
tives complained that numerous projects were being delayed for




Requests to fill vacancies with foreign workers were routinely
turned down by the government. The Shah feared the potential
dangers to Iran's culture and economic growth that would exist
coincident with a large expatriot labor force. This fear re-
sulted in the Labor Ministry's decision to exclude all requests
for skilled and semi-skilled labor from the nation's foreign
recruitment program—a move that served only to compound Iran's
labor difficulties.
The Fifth Development Plan called for training of some
200,000 first and second-class technicians along with over
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64650,000 skilled and semi-skilled laborers. Had the Shah's
government survived, it is possible these goals may have been
met and Iran's labor problems solved. Unfortunately in 1977-78
when political stability deteriorated and eventually crumbled
there existed nearly a million unemployed Iranians who were
insufficiently trained and educated to fill the hundreds of
thousands of vacant employment positions which existed along
side them.
Iran's infrastructure difficulties arise principally
from the nation's demographic situation. Most of the popula-
tion is distributed in the north, northwest, and Tehran
districts while the east, southeast, and central desert regions
are sparsely populated. On the other hand the principal ports
of entry are on the Persian Gulf—Khorramshahr , Bandar-Shapur
,
Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. This means that Iran's imports
must travel hundreds of miles over poor roads and railroads
to reach their ultimate distribution points. By 1973 a 5200
kilometer railway system connecting Tehran with Khorramshahr,
Yazd-Kerman, Mashad, Jolfa-Tabriz , and Bandar Shah had been
completed. Bandar Abbas, a principal port, was not yet con-
nected to the rail system and there was no direct link between
Bandar-Shapur and Tehran. Bottlenecks in Iran's transportation
system caused log jams in the nation's ports.
In 1973 Iran's ports had a nominal annual capacity of
3.7 million tons. By 1975 however the ports were attempting
to handle an annual load of 8.5 million tons of cargo. By
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mid-year some 700,000 tons of cargo were stacked up in Bandar-
Shapur alone— a port designed for less than 450,000 cargo tons.
At Khorramshahr , the principal port, over 200 ships were wait-
ing to unload their cargoes: ships were having to wait 160
days or more before entering the harbor. At one point more
than one million tons of goods were being held in ships' holds
awaiting the opportunity to unload. Even as the offloading
of goods speeded up, many goods lay around unwarehoused—as
much as one million tons in September/October 1975.
One cause of slow cargo movement was that nearly half of
all imports were government purchases, and Ministries took
sometimes up to six months—and more— to clear them. Even in
non-government purchases the bureaucratic red tape often bogged
down the process. Robert Graham tells the story of a banker
who "spent over four months trying to clear a canoe from cus-
toms because the Ministry of War insisted on knowing what form
of armament it carried and the nature of its radar system
—
even though the Commerce Ministry had given prior approval."
A second difficulty was a shortage of trucks. The government
made an emergency requisition of several thousand trucks and trail-
ers, but soon realized they had gained little as no drivers were
available. As recently as 1977 rows of rusting trucks could
be seen parked in Bandar Abbas where they had been awaiting
drivers for nearly three years.
At the time, Iran's transportation and labor difficul-
ties appeared short-term, not posing a serious obstacle to
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intermediate or long-term absorptive capacity. Unfortunately
the port congestion caused time loss, damaged goods, and
spoilage, all of which irurth.er contributed to the discontent
already created by unemployment. This discontent with Iran's
economy led to discontent with the government and, along with





V. ARMS TRANSFERS, THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Gone his way is Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 4 46th and
last of the Iranian shahs. Gone with him is the Pahlavi
dynasty, founded fifty years ago by his father, the last
of an uncountable number of dynasties. Gone with the dy-
nasty is the world's oldest monarchy, stretching back for
twenty-five centuries.
At 1:08 p.m. Tehran time on January 16, 1979, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi Shananshah Aryamehr, carrying a copy of the Koran,
embarked on the imperial Boeing 727 and left Iran—never to
return. The political turmoil that preceeded the Shah's de-
parture has been well publicized and documented. Equally
well publicized and documented (with greater or lesser degrees
of accuracy) are the myriad reasons for Iran's political in-
stability. Political analysts may never fully understand all
the intricacies of the "revolution" which led to the Shah's
downfall. One can only hope that bit by bit, item by item,
some light can be shed on the validity of various criticisms
of the Shah's reign. To briefly digress, the purpose of
this paper is to determine the impact of American arms trans-
fers to Iran on the political instability of 1977-78. The
preceeding three chapters have surveyed U.S. arms sales to
Iran, reviewed the nation's economic development plans, and
analyzed its economic performance during the last decade of
the Shah's reign. It is the purpose of this chapter to combine
the foregoing information and—hopefully
—
provide an accurate




On September 22, 1979, the Islamic Revolution Plan Office
announced its "Principles of the Countries Economic and Social
6 Q
Policies." ' The announcement provided time frames for imple-
mentation of socioeconomic policies in three stages—short,
medium, and long-term. For each stage principles to be observed
were provided. Interestingly the first principle to be observed
for each stage was "national security and the guarantee of rights
of individual and personal freedom." One may well question the
Shah's intent in the guarantee of individual rights and freedom,
but few could argue that he was not interested in his country's
national security. Why then do the Shah's critics accuse him
of "squandering" billions on arms purchases? The answer lies
not in the arms buildup but in the economy. Of the many griev-
ances voiced by the revolutionary followers of Ayatollah Kho-
meiny, the pattern of Iran's economic development certainly
ranks high on the list.
Since Iran's economic woes have been discussed above,
it is only necessary here to provide a brief review of the
main features:
(1) a real decline in oil revenues beginning in 1977, with
a decline in output projected to occur in the mid-1980s
and little prospect of finding alternative souces of
foreign exchange on a comparable scale.
(2) an inefficient bureaucracy, without a proper planning
apparatus, replete with corruption and an inability to
implement equitable social and economic reforms.
93

(3) low productivity in the industrial sector, rendering
Iranian manufactured goods non-competitive on interna-
tional markets, and unending reliance of both public and
private industrial sectors on government funding.
(4) a continually growing inequality in incomes, within
urban areas and between urban and rural populations.
(5) a real decline in agricultural production necessitating
massive food imports and controls.
(6) an ever increasing defense budget necessary to sustain
and modernize existing military forces and support the
Shah's foreign policies.
(7) a return to balance of payments and fiscal deficits,
with little prospect of future revenue surpluses due
to overly ambitious development plans and rapidly in-
creasing current expenditures.
By this point the connections between military expenditures
and Iran's economic woes should be reasonably clear. Defense
spending was not the cause of financial difficulties, it merely
added to already existing problems. Actual purchases of foreign
arms accounted for only a small portion of the defense budget.
The remaining expenditures effected the economy in the same
manner as other, non-military capital and current expenditures.
Thus, had some portion of Iran's defense expenditures been de-
voted to non-military projects the net macroeconomic result
would have been essentially the same.
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In attempting to analyze the causes of Iran ' s 'political
turmoil one cannot separate defense expenditures from total
government spending. Nor can arms purchases be reviewed sepa-
rately from the total of all defense expenditures. Iran's
political difficulties lie not in the economic means but in
the ends. The Shah's goals were not at fault; only the means
of obtaining those goals can be criticized. Let us now turn
to the actual implications of Iran's economic policies and how
they contributed to the Shah's downfall.
A. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND RISING EXPECTATIONS
Ted Gurr defines "relative deprivation" as
. . .actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their
value expectations and their value capabilities. Value
expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which
people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capa-
bilities are the goods and conditions they think they are
capable of getting and keeping.
Gurr's hypothesis is that "(t)he potential for collective
violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of rela-
72tive deprivation among members of a collectivity." The
emphasis of the relative deprivation hypothesis is on the
perception of deprivation, be it that of the observer or the
observed. Relative deprivation is tied to rising expectations
through Gurr's hypothesis that "(t)he susceptibility of a
group to conversion to rising value expectations through sym-
bolic exposure to a new mode of life varies strongly with the
intensity and scope of preexisting relative deprivation in the
group." Here lies the root of Iran's political turmoil.
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People are generally willing to live under a government
that fails to provide uniform political participation so long
as the individuals* value expectations and value capabilities
are essentially equal. This situation implies an absence of
rising expectations. Thus a struggle to gain political par-
ticipation must be preceded by the perception of relative
deprivation. The peasant farmer who has always been a peasant
farmer and always expects to be a peasant farmer (because that
is his perceived lot in life) will not be a political threat
to the ruling regime
.
In 1953 Iran's populace perceived the nation as relatively
deprived because value capabilities were below value expecta-
tions. Iran's oil resources offered rising expectations that
were inhibited due to foreign ownership of the Iranian petro-
leum industry. As such the people gave their support to
Prime Minister Mossadegh who boosted value capabilities by
nationalizing the oil fields. Unfortunately for Mossadegh
the nation's value capabilities remained retarded due to the
embargo on Iranian oil established by the western nations.
As a result, the populace was generally willing to accept the
Shah's return as it meant a probable end to the embargo, an
increase in value capabilities, and a decline in perceived
relative deprivation. By 1955, as Iran's oil revenues began
to increase rapidly, the populace were satisfied they had done
well, and the Shah was once again secure in his position.
96

Much the same situation occurred in 1974. The perception
then was that oil industry's rich profits, though not accru-
ing to a foreign power, were likewise not filtering down to
74the people. Rising oil profits boosted value expectations
and created the perception of relative deprivation. The Shah's
economic and agricultural policies fostered the continuation,
of economic inequality, boosted inflation, fostered unemploy-
ment, and created a great exodus of rural dwellers to the
cities. The peasants observed the results of westernization,
modernization, and economic growth but failed to obtain their
value expectations. Middle class laborers, technocrats,
educators, etc., faired somewhat better, though by late 1977,
as inflation continued to spiral upward and economic growth
slowed substantially, even their relative capabilities lagged
somewhat behind their expectations. As for the economic elite,
their hitherto rising expectations suddenly peaked with the
economy and started a slow downhill slide. Thus, virtually
all economic levels of the population began, by 1975, to
experience some lesser or greater degree of economic
deprivation.
Gurr cites five indices of deprivation in addition to
economic deprivation. " The scope of this paper does not
allow for a thorough treatment of each—but they were all
present:
(1) Political Discrimination—Iran's constitutional monarchy
more often than not functioned like an absolute
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monarchy as the Shah had the final word on all matters.
Furthermore Iran's one party political system (established
in 1975) closed most or all political elite positions and
some participatory activities to large segments of the
population.
(2) Dependence on private foreign capital—according to Gurr,
"(t)he greater the proportion of national product that
accrues to foreign suppliers of goods and capital, the
76greater the inferred intensity of deprivation. ..."
Purchase of foreign arms, rising food imports, large
numbers of highly paid expatriate laborers, and foreign
ownership of numerous firms all served to give the im-
pression that Iran was paying a lot of money for foreign
goods and services.
(3) Lack of educational opportunity—as discussed earlier,
illiteracy was widespread even in the late 1970s and
Iran's educational and technical training programs were
woefully underfinanced and overburdened.
(4) Potential separtism—though not directly responsible
for the revolution, Iran's Kurdish and Arab population
had long been oppressed and favored some form of
autonomy
.
(5) Religious cleavages—these, according to Gurr, ". . .are
a chronic source of deprivation—inducing conflict."
A cleaveage did exist between the majority Sunni Muslims
in Iran and the minority Arab Shias in the southern
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provinces. Though this cleavage has resulted in con-
flict in the past, it was far from a principal issue in
the late 1970s. More fundamental was the Iranian re-
ligious hierarchies' perception of a cleavage between
the tenets of Islam and growing westernization of Iran.
This issue will be discussed in greater detail in fol-
lowing pages
.
B. THE BAZAAR AND THE DISENFRANCHISED MASSES
Coincident with the construction boom of 1973-76, tens
of thousands of peasants migrated to the cities in search of
employment. Although the land reform succeeded in granting
ownership of land to the peasants, it does not appear that
any perceptible increase in buying power accrued as a result
of the peasants' new holdings. The land reform was not ac-
companied by any government sponsored program to provide
economic credit, fertilizer, tractors, improved irrigation,
or the like. In other words, though the peasants gained owner-
ship of their land, they lost the benefits provided by their
former landlords. Hence, in the long-term, their productivity
declined, and, due to the continually rising cost of living,
they were forced off the farms and into the urban areas in
search of more lucrative jobs.
In the cities the peasants soon found that employment op-
portunities were not as plentiful as the booming economy had
led them to believe. As discussed earlier, Iran's labor
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shortages were in the area of skilled and semi-skilled laborers
as well as middle level managers and technocrats. The recently-
arrived peasants were ill equipped to fill the labor gaps and
the government's training programs were woefully inadequate.
Equally inadequate were the government's social welfare pro-
grams, e.g., Iran's Social Security Organization did not come
78into existence until the Social Security Act of 1975. Having
no place to go and nothing to do, the peasants turned to the
"Bazaari" (tradesmen and shopkeepers) for help.
Through twenty-five centuries of Persian history all roads
led to the bazaar. The bazaar was traditionally the market-
place, financial center, meeting place, and network for infor-
mation and mobilization of the Persian populace. Furthermore
the "bazaari" have been traditional allies of the mullahs
and for centuries the two have been mutually dependent. The
"bazaari" comprised the larger portion of Iran's burgeoning
lower-middle class, and it was to the "bazaari" that the ur-
banized peasants owed their allegiance—even after they found
79
employment.
C. THE POLITICIZATION OF THE BAZAAR
80
The tenets of radical Shiaism appealed to a wide cross
section of Iran's populace, but no group served to broaden
the mullahs power base more than the "bazaari." As noted
above the "bazaari" and the mullahs had been rather closely
tied for several centuries. The mullahs traditionally took
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responsibility for education the children of the "bazaari,"
who in turn provided the mullahs with financial aid. The
"bazaari" were particularly valuable to the mullahs because of
their ability to raise a crowd almost instantly. This proved
necessary for religious observances and highly useful for
political demonstrations.
The "bazaari" have long been organized into "Heyats,7
informal and loosely institutionalized missions responsible
for hundreds of religious gathering places outside the system
of mosques. This informal leadership system has provided
the "bazaari" with a certain degree of social cohesiveness
.
Intermarriage, parochial association, and grouping by pro-
vincial background have served to further maintain close and
effective links within the "bazaari" ranks. Because the bazaar,
not only in Tehran but throughout Iran, is so deeply traditional
and so profoundly grounded in Islam, it has historically been
a focus of opposition to shahs. In 1978-79 the bazaars re-
emerged in this role. When Ayatollah Khomeini called on the
"bazaari" to strike, they faithfully obeyed, and thus worked
powerfully to bring down the Shah.
In late 19 74, the Shah, working through Prime Minister
Hoveyda, tried to attack inflation by organizing a seemingly
well-intentioned anti-profiteering campaign. Approximately
10,000 recruits from all walks of life were unleashed upon
the bazaars. Thousands of small merchants and shopkeepers
were jailed, fined, or banished to remote towns. This
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exercise of power, though probably well meant and justified
by the facts, cost the Shah his last support among the
"bazaari" and among more prominent businessmen as well.
Having no political party and no interest group where they
could air their grievances, the "bazaari" took them to the
81
mosques and their traditional allies, the mullahs.
The foregoing is not to say that the "bazaari" and the
mullahs have always operated as a unit. Not since the re-
ligious riots of 1963 (during which Ayatollah Khomeini was
exiled) had Iran's religious elements received such substan-
tial political support from the bazaar. The "bazaari" are,
after all, working class people whose lives are radically
disrupted by political turmoil. On the other hand, the mul-
lahs, and particularly the more radical Ayatollahs, have long
protested the Shah's rule. Nevertheless, Iranian history has
shown time and time again that neither the mullahs nor the
bazaari alone nor together are capable of overthrowing the
nation's leader. Only in league with other social groups
—
the disenfranchised peasants, the intelligensia, some factions
of the military—are the "bazaari" and the mullahs a political
force to be reckoned with.
Finally, it should be noted that while specific economic
and political issues caused the disaffection of the "bazaari,"
general mismanagement of Iran's economy was the catalyst that
brought together the combination of forces necessary to pro-
duce a successful revolution.
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D. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLA KHOMEINI
This subchapter, contrary to the title's implication, is
not meant to be a biography of Ayatollah Khomeini. The pur-
pose here is to briefly discuss the final link in the revolu-
tionary chain—the leading religious clergy. The linkages
between disenfranchised peasants, disaffected "bazaari," and
disenchanted mullahs have already been shown. However, a
direct connection between the revolutionary forces and the
Shah's defense expenditures policy is not yet evident. If
such a connection exists, it will be found here, in the atti-
tudes and perceptions of the revolutionary leaders. And, it
was Ayatollah Khomeini who eventually came to symbolize the
unity of purpose of the revolutionary coalition.
Interestingly, when one reviews the voluminous writings
of Khomeini and his myriad interviews of 1978-79, only very
rarely does he make mention of the Shah's arms expenditures.
On the subject of military issues he much prefers to criti-
8 2
cize U.S. "policies of domination with respect to Iran,"
and American military advisers in the nation. When Khomeini
did discuss Iran's foreign arms purchases, it was more often
than not from the viewpoint of their being not only an un-
necessary waste of oil revenues, but also a means of economic-
ally strengthening the United States.
The Shah has been giving our oil to the United States
to strengthen its government, without any permission or
legitimacy. With the revenues, he has been buying
American-made arms which are in no way useful to the
people of Iran. 3
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Khomeini's reference to the uselessness of American-made arms
presents something of an enigma when one considers his con-
cern with Iran's national security, as earlier discussed.
This attitude is made further unclear by his instructions to
the Iranian army, on the day of the Shah's departure, to pre-
vent Americans from dismantling installations which, he noted,
84
were bought with Iranian money. six days later, in an inter-
view with the Der Spiegal, Khomeini was asked what would hap-
pen to Iran's armed forces and their modern equipment. "Our
country will not be a depot for foreign arms we do not need.
The strength of our armed forces corresponds to their require-
ments with regard to maintaining internal law and order and
q c
avoiding possible unrest." ' In a speech to Tehran's religious
leaders in late February 1979, Khomeini referred to the Shah's
O c
army as a "parasite guided by aliens."
Unfortunately the foregoing statements (some taken out of
context) do not paint a clear picture of Ayatollah Khomeini's
attitude toward U.S. arms transfers to Iran. Undoubtedly he
(and his followers as well) was displeased with the Shah's de-
fense expenditures. However, relative to Khomeini's attitudes
toward Iran's stumbling economy, the failures of agrarian re-
form, the repressive nature of SAVAK, the lack of political
participation, and the process of modernization, the Shah's




As mentioned in the introduction, in Gurr's model there
are four intervening variables between relative deprivation
and civil strife. Following is a brief summary of how each
of these factors impacted on Iran's road to revolution.
(1) Coercive Potential.
Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear
relationship whereby maximum levels of coercion, indexed
for example by military participation ratios or ratings of
regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest mag-
nitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear
to limit effectively the extent of strife. 87
The coercive potential of the Shah's military and internal
security forces would, in comparison to other nations, generally
have to be rated as moderate or medium. His policies were not
as liberal as those of the United States or France, but neither
were they as severe as repressive regimes in the Soviet Union
or the People's Republic of China. Thus, according to the
Gurr model, a high magnitude of strife would be expected.
Within the realm of coercive potential Gurr places more empha-
sis on the loyalty of coercive forces than on the coercive
8 8force size. For a developing country the size of Iran, the
Shah's military was undeniably awesome. However, in the area
of loyalty the Shah's troops were found wanting. As the revo-
lution progressed, the religious leaders, under the guidance
of Ayatollah Khomeini, appealed to the feelings of brotherhood
among the troops, and gained the sympathy of some junior officers
89
and many conscripted soldiers. ' Hence, in the end, the coercive
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potential of the Shah's military machine was insufficient to
protect his position.
2. Institutionalization. According to Gurr, there are two
facets to this variable:
One is that the existence of such structures increases men's
value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of alternative
ways to attain value satisfaction. A complementary function
is that of displacement: labor unions, political parties,
and a range of associations may provide the discontented
with routinized and typically non-violent means for express-
ing their discontents.^
The relationship between institutionalization and civil strife
is negative and linear: the greater the institutionalization,
the lower the magnitude of strife is likely to be. Iran, in
the latter half of the 1970s, possessed a relatively low level
of institutionalization. As mentioned earlier, in 1975 the
Shah proclaimed the Iranian politican system a "one-party
system." He merged the previous two parties into one, which
he called Hezb-e Rastakhiz-e Melli (National Resurgance Party)
,
and banned all other parties. He called upon Iranians to join
and support the party, and admonished the opposition to cease
their political activities or leave the country, or else to
91face the penalties. ' This did not leave much room for non-
violent expression of discontent. As for labor unions, they
are covered by the 1959 Labor Law which specifies that unions
may be established if recognized by the Ministry of Labor. The
Labor Law forbade the unions to strike or engage in any political
activity; though they were allowed to show preferences twoards
or cooperate with, political parties—which after 1975 meant
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92Rastakhiz, and no other. Thus, in Iran, institutionaliza-
tion did not serve to moderate civil strife.
3. Facilitation. As with institutionalization, facilita-
tion has two facets: past levels of civil strife and social
and structural facilitation. The operational hypotheses are
that "
. . .the greater the levels of past strife, and of
social and structural facilitation, the greater is the magni-
93tude of the strife." Iran's past history of civil strife
is well documented. In 1923 the Shah's father, following a
military coup, proclaimed himself Prime Minister, and two
years later forced the Parliament to proclaim him the new
Shah. In 1953 Mossadegh usurped the Shah's authority, but
within weeks was overthrown by the military, and the Shah
resumed his position. In 1963, Iran was rocked by riots,
strikes, and demonstrations brought on by economic conditions
and the Shah's heavy-handed rule. As for social and structural
facilitation, the Bazaari-Mullah linkage which has already been
discussed at length, served to enhance the magnitude of Iran's
civil strife.
4. Legitimacy of regime. ". . .the greater is regime
legitimacy at a given level of deprivation, the less the magni-
94
tude of consequent strife." William Forbis sums up the Shah's
legitimacy rather well when he says:
His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, erstwhile
king of kings and late Light of the Aryans, was born a
commoner, and his father, who started his working life as
a soldier at the age of fifteen, was an even commoner com-
moner. He got the throne by seizing it. Foreigners made
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fun of this fact; Iranians, knowing that in the long
reaches of history many an upstart had toppled many a
king, were resigned to accepting the coup. By the same
token, anyone wanting to overthrow the Shah seemed to
have the authorization of history. And in 1979 that's
just what happened, except with the institution of g 5
monarchy dead, no one proposed to start a new dynasty.
The Shah's legitimacy may not have enhanced the magnitude of
Iran's civil strife, but neither did it serve as a moderating
factor.
Thus we have perceived relative deprivation in most of
Iran's populace, enhanced by at least three of four possible





As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this work
is to analyze the linkages between Iran's recent political
turmoil, economic conditions in Iran during the decade pre-
ceeding the Shah's fall from power, and American arms trans-
fers to Iran. Admittedly, the bulk of this account has focused on
the intermediate link—the economy. However, this is as it
should be. For both the Shah's arms acquisition policy and
the revolution that ended his reign were responses to economic
conditions that existed in Iran. Iran's foreign policy, as
laid down by the Shah, dictated what weapons were to be pur-
chased, but oil revenues made the purchases feasible, and in-
deed made possible the foreign policies followed.
The Shah's fall from power was the end result of a long
string of governmental failures in the realm of economics
and politics. The revolution could, in fact, have been due
to only one seemingly inconsequential factor—the Shah's anti-
profiteering campaign in the bazaar. Had this event never
occurred, it is feasible that the "bazaari" would have re-
mained acquiescent, the mullahs and Ayatollahs would not have
had the public power base they required to back their vocal
dissent, and the Shah might still be in power. This theory
is admittedly simplistic. Nevertheless it demonstrates the
delicate political balance evident in Iran. Furthermore, if
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one were to accept this theory, or any similar nature, the
question of arms transfer and political stability becomes moot.
Perhaps we will never fully understand the roots of Iran's
revolution, but in the search for understanding we should not
fall into the trap of tunnel vision—arms transfers from the
United States to Iran were not the sole cause of Iran's revo-
lution. We have seen that the Shah's opponents criticized
his arms expenditure policy. On the other hand we have also
seen that the Shah's policy was not statistically at odds with
the defense policies of other developing nations. Furthermore
it has been shown that Iran's arms expenditures probably did
not have a negative impact on economic growth and, in fact,
may have aided growth in a more controlled manner than had
the funds been devoted to other, far less cost effective
projects
.
On the subject of rechannel ling Iran" s arms expenditures
into other economic endeavors, two possible avenues are most
often put forth. First it has oft been suggested that the
resources should have been channelled into the agricultural
sector. As recently as the late 1960s Iran was agriculturally
self sufficient. However, since the onset of the industrial
revolution Iran has not been agriculturally competitive with
the world's major producers. As such, economic trade theory
dictates that Iran would be economically better off to channel
its resources into endeavors in which the nation has a competi-
tive edge—and import its food. This, intentionally or otherwise
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is the policy that the Shah chose. Agricultural, industrial,
and monetary independence may be prestigious for a leader but
from a purely economic standpoint it is not always the best
policy.
The second suggestion often proposed is to channel excess
funds into an overseas investment portfolio. General consen-
sus is that Iran's oil output would began an irreversible de-
cline in the mid-1980s. As it was unlikely that the non-oil
economic sector would be prepared by that time to take on the
nation's economic burden, a portfolio of profitable overseas
investments may have been to key to solving Iran's potential
future economic distress. The operative word here is "profit-
able." In today's world of spiralling inflation and widely
fluctuating monetary values, what may have been profitable
today could become a complete write-off tomorrow. Furthermore,
in light of the new regime's belligerance toward the developed
western nations, a large overseas investment portfolio could
be as equally useless as a rusting pile of high technology
military hardware.
The point is this. Although the Shah's arms acquisition
policy was ambitious and perhaps overly aggressive, it was
not conducted to the detriment of other economic sectors,
nor would a reduction in arms expenditures have provided the
nation with any appreciable benefits. Simply put, American
arms transfers to Iran did not help or hinder the nation's
economy or political climate. The revolution that overthrew
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the Shah of Iran would, in all probability, have occurred
no matter what military improvement program he followed.
Though substantial evidence exists to support this theory,
a great deal of further research on the subject is still
warranted. Following is a list of questions that future
researchers should endeavor to answer, both to aid in analysis
of the Iranian case and to help understand the implications
of arms transfer policy.
(1\ Iran's arms acquisitions leaned heavily toward high-
technology major weapons systems. Little funding was devoted
to weapons suitable for small-scale ground battles and riot
control. Why did the Shah prefer this policy, what were its
implications, and what weapons mix would have been more
suitable for the nation's needs?
s (2) How cost effective was agricultural production in
Iran? Which, in the long term, was more important—agricul-
tural independence or agrarian reform (as carried out by the
Shah)? Was it possible for Iran to have both peasant land
ownership and economically competitive agricultural produc-
tion? If so, what were the costs, political and economic,
involved?
(3) What was the spillover effect of Iran's armed forces
on the civilian sector? Was military training valuable in
finding civilian employment? How much benefit was gained in
the civilian sector by the expansion of military infrastructure?
(4) How practical were Iran's development plans? More
specifically, how efficient was Iran's economic planning
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organization? How could economic planning in developing
countries be improved and how do defense expenditures fit
into the development scheme?
A final note. In addition to the foregoing questions,
we must never fail to take into account people's perceptions
of the situation. Volumes of statistical data proving a
point are useless if a nation's people perceive the situation
differently. It is hoped that some future researcher will
endeavor to record the attitudes and perceptions of Iran's
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